Figuring out how to make home care jobs more attractive has become a top policy priority. This study investigates the impact of wages, hours, and benefi ts on the retention of home care workers. Design and Methods: Using a 2-wave survey design and a sample of home care workers from Maine, the factors associated with turnover intentions, actual turnover, and job-to-job transitions are examined. The analysis uses actual data on hours, wages, and benefi ts at current and subsequent jobs and controls for perceived rewards and work conditions, personal characteristics, and local labor market conditions. Results: Although the analysis fi nds that improved work conditions and nonpecuniary rewards of home-based direct care work have signifi cant negative effects on turnover intentions, compensation accounts for more actual job turnover. Higher wages, more hours, and travel cost reimbursement are found to be signifi cantly associated with reduced turnover. Although wages and hours appear to have stronger effects, health benefi ts do appear to have some signifi cance in predicting job-to-job transitions. Implication: Although improving compensation presents budgetary challenges to home care agencies, for this low-income workforce, the ability to earn higher wages and work more hours may be more of an imperative than improved work conditions.
Background
High turnover and vacancy rates are becoming a serious concern in the long-term care fi eld ( Stone & Dawson, 2008 ; Stone & Wiener, 2001 ). The demand for workers to provide home-based personal assistance services to the elderly individuals is growing fast with worker shortages occurring in Maine as well as in many other parts of the country ( Froymovich, 2007 ; Kaye, Chapman, Newcomer, & Harrington, 2006 ; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Offi ce of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2003 ; Pohlmann, 2006 ). Pohlmann warns that Maine's " care gap " will likely be aggravated further by competition for workers brought about by strong demand in other entry-level occupations that tend to be less demanding and better compensated than homebased direct care. Stone and Dawson cite similar concerns for other labor markets. In response to these trends, there are numerous efforts at the local, state, and federal levels to make home care jobs more attractive relative to other jobs ( HarrisKojetin, Lipson, Fielding, Kiefer, & Stone, 2004 ; Stone & Dawson ) . The Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI) recommends that improvement efforts focus on higher wages, affordable health insurance benefi ts, and more hours ( Dawson, 2007 ) . Health Care for Health Care Workers, an initiative of PHI, advocates for affordable health care benefi ts for direct care workers arguing that health benefi ts may even be preferable to higher wages ( Lipson & Regan, 2004 ) . The emphasis of most of the Better Jobs Better Care demonstration and research projects is on changing management and supervision to improve work conditions ( Stone & Dawson ) . This study investigates the impact of wages, hours, and benefi ts, controlling for perceived rewards and work conditions, personal characteristics, and local labor market conditions, on the retention of home care workers.
Previous Research
Most of the research on job quality and turnover among direct care workers has been done in nursing home and assisted living facilities. The general consensus from this body of work indicates that adequate wages and affordable health insurance benefi ts are of key importance, in addition to good supervision and management, appropriate training, opportunities for advancement, involvement in patient care decisions, and reasonable workloads ( Brannon, Barry, Kemper, Schreiner, & Vasey, 2007 ; Castle, Engberg, Anderson, & Men, 2007 ; Harris-Kojetin et al., 2004 ) . Although informative, the usefulness of these studies may be somewhat limited by cross-sectional study design and the use of subjective measures of both outcomes and job attributes ( Brannon et al. ) . Most studies rely on worker perceptions of various aspects of the job, including wages and benefi ts, rather than on actual measures of job attributes (Brannon et al.) and, with the exception of Castle and colleagues , have investigated factors associated with job satisfaction and intent to stay/leave rather than actual turnover. However, although self-reported turnover intentions and actual turnover are highly correlated, intention to quit alone accounts for only a portion of actual turnover ( Barak, Nissly, & Levin, 2001 ; Brannon et al. ) . There may be an even wider gap between intentions and actual behavior among low-income workers with less education. These workers generally do not have savings and assets or the more lucrative job offers that other workers have.
The usefulness of facility-based direct care worker studies may also be limited in understanding the dynamics of turnover among home-based direct care workers ( Benjamin, Matthias, Kietzman, & Furman, 2008 ; Brannon et al., 2007 ; Kemper et al., 2008 ; Montgomery, Holley, Deichert, & Kosloski, 2005 ) . As Kemper and colleagues (2008) point out, home-based direct care jobs differ from those in nursing homes and assisted living facilities in ways that may affect the relationship between compensation and turnover. For example, home care workers generally have greater autonomy and control over their schedules. They also tend to have more responsibility for and control over patient care and may be able to build deeper and more meaningful relationships with clients and families ( Howes, 2005 ; Kemper et al., 2008 ; Stacey, 2005 ) . These job attributes may create a willingness to accept lower wages and fewer benefi ts. On the other hand, home care jobs usually involve considerable travel and less consistent hours Kemper et al., 2008 ; Stone & Dawson, 2008 ) . Compared with facility-based jobs, home care jobs also offer fewer opportunities for advancement ( Froymovich, 2007 ) . Direct care workers who work independently in homes of clients may become isolated and experience greater levels of job stress ( Froymovich ; Howes ; Stone & Dawson ) .
There are only a handful of studies examining turnover among home care workers. Kemper and colleagues (2008) and Howes (2008) used openended questions to determine what factors make home care jobs attractive. Brannon and colleagues (2007) examined the factors associated with job quality and intent to stay/leave. A review of the literature found only two studies specifi cally examining the relationship between actual compensation and turnover among home-based direct care workers ( Howes, 2005 ; Zawadski, 2005 ) . Howes (2005) used administrative data to track the employment dynamics of a large sample ( N = 14,400) of home care workers in San Francisco County from November 1997 to February 2002, during which time the wage rate for home care jobs was raised four times as the result of living wage ordinances and an inexpensive health insurance program for home care workers was implemented. Although the data used by Howes (2005) did not include information on actual enrollment, she did fi nd a strongly signifi cant and positive association between the availability of new health benefi ts program and the probability that a person remained employed for at least 1 year. She also found a separate and strongly signifi cant positive association between the hourly wage rate and retention. Howes ' (2005) study used changes over time in the availability of benefi ts and wage rates to identify effects rather than cross-sectional comparison of groups of workers enrolled in the health insurance program and those who chose not to enroll. However, the estimated effects may still suffer from an upward bias caused by correlation between the attractiveness of the health benefi ts and unobserved variation in worker turnover propensity. Although the database available to Howes (2005) included information on race, ethnicity, and gender, it did not include information on the worker's age, education, marital status, or family status, nor did it contain information on previous work history. The study examined the retention rates of new entrants to the home care workforce and therefore cannot provide information as to whether health benefi ts attract a more committed workforce or whether the benefi ts motivate existing workers to stay, nor can it provide information as to the relative effects of wages and benefi ts and other job attributes.
This study adds to the literature by examining turnover using (a) a two-wave survey to examine turnover intentions, actual turnover, and job-tojob transitions; (b) a sample of home care workers; (c) actual data on hours, wages, and benefi ts at current and subsequent jobs; and (d) an extensive set of worker-level variables and perceptional measures of job problems and non-pecuniary rewards as controls.
Conceptual Framework
Economic explanations of turnover assume that workers respond rationally to job and labor market conditions and focus on the human capital characteristics of workers and job factors related to compensation ( Barak et al., 2001 ) . Job search theory focuses on the role wage rates and benefi ts play in explaining job transitions. If wage levels and benefi ts do not suffi ciently compensate for adverse working conditions such as risk of injury and job stress as well as travel and other work-related costs, workers can increase their utility by changing jobs or quitting ( Campbell, 1994 ; Clark & Oswald, 1996 ; Van Ophem, 1991 ) . Theoretical models ( Campbell ) and empirical studies ( Clark, Georgellis, & Sanfey, 1998 ; Clark, 1999 ) indicate that wage changes are more strongly associated with turnover than wage levels. This suggests that workers who receive a wage increase are happier about their jobs than those who do not receive a raise, regardless of the wage they started at ( Clark et al. ) . Clark and colleagues also found statistically signifi cant " pull " effects from higher wages at subsequent jobs, even after controlling for wages, hours, overall job satisfaction and tenure at previous jobs. Recent studies in the direct care fi eld indicate similar dynamics are at play among direct care workers. Using a sample of facility-based direct care workers, Castle and colleagues (2007) found that higher scores on a subscale measuring satisfaction with job rewards (fairness of pay and chances for further advancement) were signifi cantly associated with lower scores on thinking about leaving, thinking about job search, searching for a new job, and actual turnover. Brannon and colleagues (2007) found a small but signifi cant negative relationship between intent to leave and the extent to which home care workers felt the income from the job was rewarding compared with other jobs in the fi eld.
The " job lock " literature in economics is also relevant here. Job lock occurs when workers with employer-provided health insurance coverage remain in jobs to avoid losing coverage. The corresponding phenomenon -" job push " -occurs when those without health benefi ts leave for jobs that do offer such benefi ts or more affordable benefi ts. The research evidence is mixed with some studies fi nding no evidence of job lock ( Holtz-Eakin, 1994 ) and others fi nding signifi cant reductions in turnover associated with employer-based health benefi ts but only for certain workers ( Buchmueller & Valletta, 1996 ; Gilleskie & Lutz, 2002 ; Madrian, 1994 ) . There is some evidence that job lock effects are stronger for women ( Buchmueller & Valletta ) and weaker for workers from low-income households ( Holtz-Eakin ).
Economists generally expect workers to value monetary compensation more than in-kind benefi ts. However, because health insurance coverage is usually cheaper if purchased through an employer ' s group plan than an individual plan, workers may value health insurance benefi ts more than the same dollar amount in wages ( Royalty, 2008 ) . In contrast, because most direct care workers are from low-income households they may value wage dollars more than health benefi ts because of budget constraints related to meeting more immediate needs like housing, food, and transportation. Moreover, they and their children may be eligible for health benefi ts through Medicaid and other means-tested programs.
Adverse work conditions could reduce workers ' tolerance for low wages and a lack of benefi ts. For example, using a sample of direct care workers from nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home care settings, Brannon and colleagues (2007) examined the association between intent to leave and job rewards and problems. Although they were not able to control for wages and benefi ts directly, they did include a variable assessing the perceived availability of other better paying jobs. They found that a lack of advancement and skill development opportunities and excessive workload had separate positive effects on expressed intent to leave. In contrast, non-pecuniary job-related rewards may create a willingness to remain in jobs despite low wages and few benefi ts. Brannon and colleagues also found that a subscale measuring the degree to which a direct care worker ranked the altruistic aspects of the job had a separate and negative effect on turnover intentions.
This study investigates the impact of wages, hours, and benefi ts, controlling for perceived rewards and work conditions, personal characteristics, and local labor market conditions, on the retention of home care workers. Specifi cally, two questions are addressed: (a) Do home care workers prefer increased wages or health insurance coverage and which accounts for more actual job turnover? and (b) To what extent can improved work conditions and nonmonetary job-related rewards compensate for low wages and a lack of benefi ts?
Design and Methods

Sample Construction and Survey Design
The analysis reported here was conducted as part of a larger project funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The objectives of the overall project were to (a) increase health insurance coverage among Maine's home care workers, (b) investigate the appropriateness of Maine's public insurance program (Dirigo) as an insurance product for the home care industry, and (c) examine the impact of health insurance benefi ts on the recruitment and retention of home care workers.
To construct as comprehensive a sample frame as possible, lists of home care agencies were obtained from the Maine's Offi ce of Elder Care, professional business and direct care worker organizations, and nonprofi t organizations working in the health care and elder care fi elds throughout Maine. After removing duplicates, we contacted 220 entities to determine suitability for the CMS-funded project. After extensive followup and continuous vetting of the list to remove agencies that did not provide personal care services or employ paraprofessional staff, agencies no longer in business, single individuals caring for family members or self-employed individuals, and agencies that provided direct care services to elderly clients living in assisted living or other group-living arrangements, we ended up with a list of 122 home care employers. From these, 50 agencies were selected (grant funds limited the size of the sample frame) to provide variation in terms of geographic and rural/urban location, agency size, and majority of private-pay versus Medicaid clients. After intensive recruitment efforts, 25 employers agreed to participate in the study. Most of the remaining 25 declined to participate because they were small " mom-and-pop " employers with little administrative capacity and they found our data requirements onerous. Therefore, although the participating agencies range in size, location, and service payment or reimbursement type, they are likely to be underrepresentative of very small, more informally administrated home care employers. Table 1 provides a brief description of the employer and direct care worker samples.
The typical direct care worker in this sample is a White married woman with adult children. She has a high school education and is just as likely as not to be the primary earner in her household. The majority of the direct care workers in this sample come from low-income households, with annual incomes of less than $40,000. Less than one third are working full time (measured as 34 or more hr/ week) and almost 30% have a second job. Compared with analysis of national statistics provided by Montgomery and colleagues (2005) , the sample used here is similar in age but is a bit more educated and more likely to be married (although the variable used here includes those who are married or living with a partner). The sample also comprised more women and U.S. native -born population.
The median hourly wage earned by workers in the sample was $8.85, with a range of $6.25 to $25. The wide range refl ects the fact that those who worked for agencies whose clients were primarily private pay earned higher wages. Wages also varied according to the type of services workers provided clients and whether they also had other responsibilities. Although the large majority of workers provided " unskilled " personal care services (feeding, bathing, toileting, companionship, housekeeping, and transportation, etc.) , some also provided semiskilled and skilled health care services (administration of medication, basic physical therapy, vital signs, etc.). Some workers also received wage premiums for mentoring or training other home care workers. Most of the workers had health insurance coverage through their home care agency employer (10.5%), their spouse or partner's employer-provided plan (25.8%), through a private plan (9.5%), or through Maine's Medicaid program (21%) or Medicare (7.1%). Twenty-six percent reported no health insurance coverage. Compared with national statistics, the workers in this sample are paid lower wages but are more likely to have health insurance coverage. The national median hourly wage for direct care workers in 2005 was $9.56 ( Stone & Dawson, 2008 ) and the median national wage paid to home health workers $9.04 ( Howes, 2008 ) . According to Lipson and Regan (2004) , nationally 40% of home care workers lack health insurance coverage.
The 25 employers were asked to provide the names and contact information of all direct care workers employed by their agency and their hire date and status (part time, full time, per diem, on call, contract/temporary, on leave). These data were updated quarterly with the following additional information for those workers who had left the agency: end date, reason for leaving (fi red, resigned, promoted, loss of client, other), and whether the agency would be willing to rehire the person. Workers were surveyed in 2005 and again in 2007. For the four larger agencies with more than 100 direct care workers, 50% -75% subsamples were randomly selected. For remaining agencies, all the direct care workers currently employed (at the start of our study, January 2005) were contacted. Of the 1,126 workers, 819 (73%) participated in Survey 1 (2005) and 662 (59%) participated in Survey 2 (2007). The Survey Research Center at the University of Southern Maine was contracted to implement the survey. Confi dentiality and other human subjects' protections were reviewed and monitored by the university's institutional review board. The surveys were conducted by phone and took approximately 25 -30 min to complete. All participants received a $20 gift card for each survey. In addition to demographics and household information, employment history, second jobs, and health insurance coverage, surveyed workers were asked to provide detailed information on wages (by shift), benefi ts, and hours as well as their perceptions of job quality, satisfaction, commitment, and intent to leave. To enhance comparability with ongoing survey work in the direct care fi eld and other CMS projects, the 116-item survey drew heavily from instruments developed by Keifer and colleagues (2005) . Included in the survey were a number of items assessing the extent to which the person felt rewarded by various aspects of the job, including the altruistic aspects of caregiving, being recognized and appreciated, and having autonomy and fl exible hours. The survey also included items assessing the quality of supervision received and the extent to which the person felt concerned about various job problems, including work overload and limited opportunities for advancement. Notes : DCW = direct care worker; GED = general equivalency diploma; HI = health insurance; EPHI = employer-provided health insurance.
a Payments for services came from a mix of public (Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans Affairs, and programmatic and seed grants from federal, state, and nonprofi ts) and private sources (private insurance, out of pocket); there was no reimbursement source that provided the majority of operating funds. b Eight of the 10 agencies that reported that they provide health benefi ts to DCWs said they provide them only to those working full time. Minimum hours/week to be considered full-time worker: 24 hr (2 agencies), 30 -39 hr (11 agencies), and 40 hr (6 agencies).
c About 6.2% of the sample refused to answer the survey question about their family's annual income or stated that they did not know their family's annual income.
Analysis of sample attrition between Surveys 1 and 2 shows that there is no statistically signifi cant difference between those who participated in both surveys and those who only participated in Survey 1 in terms of wages, hours, schedule fl exibility, and health benefi ts. There is also no signifi cant difference between the two groups in terms of overall job satisfaction, turnover intentions, or on any of the job quality subscale measures. However, there are some statistically signifi cant differences in terms of personal characteristics, including marital/partner status, age, annual household income, number of jobs in the past 5 years, and duration at previously held job. Those who did not participate in the second survey are younger (41.2 compared with 48.5 years old) and less likely to be married (56% compared with 70%). Those who only participated in the fi rst survey are also more likely to be the primary earner in their home (57% compared with 49%) and to come from lower income households with less than $20,000 in annual income (43% compared with 32%). Those who only participated in Survey 1 also have signifi cantly more jobs in the past 5 years (2.9 compared with 2.4). There is, however, no signifi cant difference between the two groups in terms of educational attainment, number of children, or age of the youngest child.
The sample used in the analysis includes those workers who completed both surveys. Because job dynamics among men and women are based on different sets of decisions and constraints ( Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 2006 ; Royalty, 1996 Royalty, , 1998 Viscusi, 1980 ) , economists analyze the labor force participation dynamics of men and women separately. Turnover studies also exclude older workers because retirement-related quit decisions are qualitatively different from other job transitions ( Buchmueller & Valletta, 1996 ; Clark, 1999 ; Clark et al., 1998 ; Gilleskie & Lutz, 2002 ; Holtz-Eakin, 1994 ; Madrian, 1994 ) . Also excluded from the sample used in the analysis are workers who primarily engage in supervision and management and only rarely engage in direct care (in smaller agencies these people were often the owner of the fi rm; in larger agencies they were supervisors who occasionally provided direct care when covering for other direct care workers) and those who experienced involuntary job exits.
Variables and Measures
Dependent Variables. -Intent to leave. -Intent to leave is a 3-point self-reported measure collected during the fi rst survey ( " How likely is it that you will leave this job within the next 2 years? " ). Intent to leave is included as an outcome to enable comparison between other studies examining turnover intentions among direct care workers ( Brannon et al., 2007 ; Castle et al., 2007 ) . Furthermore, differences in the extent to which wages, benefi ts, and other job-related factors matter to intentions to quit versus actual quitting provide additional information as to what will make these jobs more attractive and provides more of an indication of the process behind quit behavior ( Brannon et al. ; Castle et al. ) .
Turnover. -Turnover is measured as the probability a worker left her job within 2 years. Determination of a job exit is based on the follow-up worker survey corroborated by employer-provided information regarding the employment status of the worker, exit date, and type of transition. Analysis examines voluntary quits; excluded from the analysis are job transitions that were involuntary (fi red, laid off due to loss of client or contract, etc.). Workers who resigned but whom the employer said they would not rehire (because employers will sometimes allow a worker to resign to avoid being fi red) are also excluded from the analysis sample.
Predictor and Control Variables. -Monetary rewards and benefi ts. -The variables of key interest here include the wage rate (logged) and a dummy variable indicating whether the person has health insurance coverage through her home care agency employer. The wage rates used were those paid to weekday shifts so as to keep separate wage effects from degree of shift work (nights, overnights, weekends). Regression models include wage level at Time 1, wage level at Time 2, and the change in wage level between Time 1 and Time 2. A dummy variable indicating whether the person receives gas or travel subsidies from their employer is also included. Because research indicates that suffi cient hours are also attractive job-related factor ( Kemper et al., 2008 ) , all models include a variable measuring hours worked during a typical week. Eligibility for health benefi ts generally requires that weekly hours exceed a certain threshold. Based on data collected from employers, health benefi ts for this sample were usually restricted to workers who work at least 35 hr/week. To disentangle potential interaction effects between increased hours and health insurance benefi ts, a control variable fl agging those who work at least 35 hr/week is included. Interactions between this dummy variable and the dummy variable indicating whether the person has or gets health insurance benefi ts are also tested. Finally, because the role of health benefi ts as an attractant will likely be less for workers with an alternative source of insurance coverage, all models also contain a control dummy variable indicating whether the person has an alternative source of health insurance coverage (set to 1 if the person has coverage through her spouse, private plan, Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Affairs, or a private plan; 0 if she does not have any health insurance coverage).
Non-pecuniary job rewards. -Following the lead of Brannon and colleagues (2007) , the analysis includes job quality subscales to control for non-pecuniary job-related rewards. For ease of comparison, the same subscale labels and, to the extent possible, the same survey items used by Brannon and colleagues are used here. The subscale recognition is based on three items measuring the extent to which the worker agrees with statements that their supervisor respects them, tells them when they are doing a good job, and is open to their ideas about client care (Cronbach's alpha .78). The subscale helping others is based on two items indicating that helping and being needed by clients and having an impact on other people's lives is rewarding (Cronbach's alpha .63). The subscale challenged is based on three survey items regarding the extent to which the person feels a sense of accomplishment, fi nds the work is challenging and interesting, and agrees that the job offers the chance to gain new skills and knowledge (Cronbach's alpha .52). The subscale decision autonomy comprises two items indicating how much autonomy workers have in doing their work and the extent to which they are involved in client care planning (Cronbach's alpha .68).
Because research indicates that schedule fl exibility is also an attractive job-related factor ( Howes, 2008 ) , all models also include measures of perceived fl exibility. The survey asked four questions about schedule fl exibility, two assessing the degree to which the employer affords fl exibility on short notice ( " How comfortable do you feel calling in sick? " and " If there is a short-term emergency or diffi culty in your life, for example, your car breaks down, and you couldn't make it to work for a few days, how accommodating and understanding would your employer be? " ) and two indicating the ease with which a worker is able to get time off with more advanced notice ( " If you wanted to schedule one day off at least one week in advance, how likely was it that you would have been able to get your shift and clients covered? " and " If you wanted to schedule one week off at least one month in advance, how likely was it that you would have been able to get your shift and clients covered? " ). All were measured on 4-point Likert scales. A short-notice fl exibility subscale was created by combining the fi rst two items (Cronbach's alpha .62), and an advanced-notice fl exibility subscale was created by combining the second two items (Cronbach's alpha .79).
Job problems and concerns. -Following again the lead of Brannon and colleagues (2007) , all models also include subscales assessing worker perceptions regarding adverse work conditions. The hazardous subscale measures the extent to which the person feels the job is physically demanding and puts them at risk of injury or being exposed to disease (Cronbach's alpha .60). The dead-end job subscale measures the extent to which the worker expressed concern with the limited chances for advancement or professional development (Cronbach's alpha .87). Work overload is measured by combining survey items about having too much work to do in the time allotted, the job taking too much out of the person, lacking support, and the extent to which the person felt that the job was emotionally and physically diffi cult (Cronbach's alpha .71).
Other job-related factors. -Brannon and colleagues (2007) also included controls for self-effi cacy and supervisor support. The self-effi cacy subscale was created by combining two items assessing the extent to which workers agreed they are properly trained and confi dent in their ability to do their job (Cronbach's alpha .63). Supervisor support (Cronbach's alpha .86) is controlled for by using a subscale comprising nine items asking the worker to evaluate the supervisor's level of competence and skill and to assess the quality of the supervision they receive (provides clear instructions, listens to and deals with the worker's concerns, provides timely feedback, is open to the worker's input into client care decisions, has realistic expectations, is supportive, and provides the worker help when needed). In addition, all models contain a dummy variable indicating the skill level of the tasks the worker typically performs as part of her job. The variable is coded 0 if she performs only personal care tasks related to activities of daily living such as bathing, toileting, and feeding, and 1 if she regularly provides personal care plus some skilled care such as the administration of medications or physical, occupational, or other therapies. This variable is intended to capture the level of challenge and variety of tasks performed by the worker. Research suggests that workers whose job tasks are more routine or mundane tend to be less satisfi ed ( Barak et al., 2001 ; Brannon et al. ) . In contrast, there is also evidence that workers assigned to more complex tasks are more likely to quit their jobs than workers assigned to simpler tasks ( Weiss, 1984 ) . This may refl ect a higher level of human capital and greater alternative job opportunities. Finally, all models also include dummy variables indicating whether the person holds a second job.
Personal or worker-level characteristics and factors. -Turnover is also affected by the availability and quality of alternative job opportunities, which in turn depend on the attractiveness of the person to other employers. Turnover studies generally fi nd that younger and better educated and more skilled workers are more likely to leave than are older and less educated workers ( Barak et al., 2001 ; Kiyak, Namazi, & Kahana, 1997 ; Royalty, 1998 ; Weiss, 1984 ) . Education level is controlled for here by including two dummy variables, one indicating whether the person has a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma and another fl agging those with a 4-year college degree. Age is specifi ed using two dummies indicating whether the person is younger than 30 or between 30 and 50 years (with those older than 50 the reference ). All models also include dummy variables indicating whether the person is married or partnered, is the primary earner in the household (spouse/partner is unemployed or the worker is single), and has a preschool-aged child.
Tenure. -Job lock studies ( Buchmueller & Valletta, 1996 ; Gilleskie & Lutz, 2002 ) show that tenure controls reduce estimation bias caused by positive correlation between wages and benefi ts and worker-specifi c turnover propensity (workers with lower mobility are more likely to be offered full-time positions with benefi ts and higher wages).
Most studies show that the effect of tenure is nonlinear, with the risk of leaving being especially high in the fi rst 2 years ( Farber, 1994 ) . Here the effects of tenure are specifi ed using two variables, one a continuous measure of the number of years in current job and a dummy fl agging those who have been in their job for less than 1 year. A more indepth analysis of the turnover dynamics of this sample of workers using life table and survival analysis revealed that although the probability of leaving was highest within the fi rst 8 months of hire (during which time 28% left), the risk of leaving remained quite high through the fi rst 2 years (with 44% leaving by month 24). After that, the quit rate drops off signifi cantly. In addition to individual variation in turnover propensity, nonlinear tenure controls likely refl ect the diffi culty employers have accurately assessing worker productivity until after the person has been hired and observed on the job for a period of time. It is also assumed that workers with longer tenure have greater job-specifi c investment and thus more to lose if they left; they are also assumed to have formed greater commitment to their employer ( Tett & Meyer, 1993 ). An alternative explanation for inverse relationship between tenure and turnover is the idea that workers with longer tenure have had more time to determine that the current job is among the best available to them ( Pissarides & Wadsworth, 1994 ) .
Local labor market conditions. -Labor market conditions are controlled for by including the local area unemployment rates for 2004 and 2006. These data come from the Maine Department of Labor and are linked to workers according to their home address at the time of the fi rst worker survey.
Analysis
In addition to standard descriptive statistics, bivariate analysis was conducted to compare worker characteristics, job-related variables, and local labor market conditions across subsamples based on intent to leave/stay and actual leave/stay. Logistic regression techniques were used to examine the infl uence of hours, wages, and benefi ts fi rst on expressed intent to leave within 2 years and then on actual turnover after 2 years. Regression analysis examines all quits as well as job-to-job transitions. To account for possible correlation of variables within agencies (which downwardly bias the standard errors of estimates), Huber -White sandwich estimations clustered by agency were used in all multivariate analyses. Additional models including multinomial logits (stay, exit for new job, exit for a spell of unemployment) and Cox regression models using job duration as dependent variable were also estimated. A number of different variable specifi cations were also tested. Results from different models and specifi cations generated results similar to those reported here. To assess job benefi t " bundling, " collinearity diagnostics were conducted by regressing job-related predictor variables on each other and calculating variance infl ation factors (VIFs). With the exception of the subscales recognition and supervisor support, the VIFs range from 1.04 to 1.68. Although there is no formal cutoff value to use for determining the presence of multicollinearity, values of VIF exceeding 10 are generally regarded as indicating problematic levels of multicollinearity. However, with logistic regression models, values above 2.5 could produce problems ( Allison, 1999 ) . The VIFs for recognition and supervisor support subscales are high, ranging from 4.6 to 5.0. The multicollinearity between these subscales may make it hard to get good estimates of their distinct effects on turnover. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the sample of female, nonsupervisory home care workers younger than 65 years ( N = 507) and the variables used in the regression analyses and bivariate analysis comparing worker characteristics, jobrelated variables, and local labor market conditions across subsamples based on intent to leave/stay and actual leave/stay. Bivariate analysis revealed signifi cant variation in worker characteristics, job-related variables, and local employment conditions across intend to stay/leave and leaver/stayer subsamples. For example, those who reported in 2005 that they intended to leave and those who actually did end up leaving by 2007 are younger and have more education. This is consistent with other turnover studies ( Barak et al., 2001 ; Kiyak et al., 1997 ; Weiss, 1984 ) and may refl ect better labor market opportunities and more ambitious career goals. Workers living in areas where local unemployment rates are higher are signifi cantly less likely to report that they intend to leave and are also less likely to leave. These results are consistent with those reported by Castle and colleagues (2007) and indicate that direct care workers are paying attention to job market conditions or that they have actually engaged in job search and have fi rsthand knowledge of local conditions.
Results
Bivariate analysis also provides some indication that health benefi ts are attractive to home care workers. Those who have employer-provided health insurance coverage were almost twice as likely to report that they intend to remain in their jobs compared with those who do not have employer-provided coverage (11% compared with 6%); although there is no signifi cant difference in employer-provided health insurance coverage between stayers and leavers at Time 1, leavers were much more likely than stayers to have obtained coverage by Time 2 (16% compared with 1%).
Bivariate analysis revealed that leavers are more likely to see an increase in typical hours per week (an average increase of 8.95 hr/week compared with a slight decline of 0.83 hr/week among stayers, t test = 7.56, p < .001). Similarly, although there is only a slight difference in wage rates in 2005 between those who said they intended to leave versus those who intended to stay, the wages of leavers increased much more by 2007 than did for stayers ($2.42, on average, compared with $0.39, t test = 5.26, p < .001). There is also some evidence that helping workers cover their travel costs reduces turnover. Among those who stayed in their jobs, 78% received transportation assistance from their employers compared with 70% of those who left ( c 2 test = 4.21, p = .040). The marginally signifi cant positive correlation between receiving transportation assistance and turnover intentions may refl ect the undesirability of the amount of travel the job entails. Short-notice schedule fl exibility also appears to hold some appeal. This measure has a signifi cant negative association with both turnover intentions and actual turnover. This fi nding is consistent with results reported by Howes (2008) . However, the provision of advanced-notice schedule fl exibility does not appear to be attractive to this sample of workers. This may refl ect their generally lower income status and an inability to afford taking time off.
The bivariate results also indicate that perceptions regarding nonmonetary job-related rewards have stronger impacts on intent to leave than on actual leaving. For example, all the job reward subscales (challenged, recognition, helping others, decision autonomy subscales) are signifi cantly associated with reduced turnover intentions, whereas only the challenged subscale is signifi cantly associated with actual turnover. Perceptions regarding adverse job conditions also have stronger associations with turnover intentions than with actual turnover. Although those who planned to leave and those who eventually did end up leaving are signifi cantly more likely to perceive the lack of advancement and skill development opportunities (dead-end subscale) as a problem, the effect of this subscale is stronger among those who intended to leave compared with those who actually left. Similarly, work overload is positively associated with intentions to leave but is insignifi cantly associated with actual turnover. The subscale measuring the Notes : HI = health insurance; EPHI = employer-provided health insurance. The sample ( N = 507) includes all nonsupervisory female direct care workers who were 64 years and younger as of 2005 and who participated in both surveys 2005 and 2007. Cross-tabulations and chi-square statistics were used to determine whether group differences on dichotomous variables are statistically signifi cant. Related statistics (gamma, Kendall's tau-C, Somer's d , and difference of means) were used to evaluate associations between ordinal survey items (job concerns, rewards, etc.) and continuous variables (wage rates, age, hours). Standard deviations are provided for ordinal and continuous variables.
job-related risk of injury and exposure to illness (hazardous) is signifi cant and positively correlated with turnover intentions. However, the same subscale is signifi cant and negatively associated with quitting. This result is counterintuitive and may have more to do with a lack of reliability or validity of the subscale measure.
To parse out the signifi cance of wage, benefi t, and hours increases from other explanatory factors, a set of logistic regressions were conducted ( Table 3 ). The fi rst two columns show the results from logistic regression equations examining expressed intent to leave (Models 1 and 2) . Models 3 -6 examine actual turnover. Turnover Model 3 includes all quits, whereas Models 4, 5, and 6 examine job-to-job transitions.
Results from intent to leave Models 1 (without interaction term between full-time status and employer-provided health insurance coverage) and 2 (with interaction term) show that, with the exception of hours, the compensation variables have only weak associations with turnover intentions once all the other variables are included. The wage effect, although in the expected direction, does not reach statistical signifi cance in either model. This may refl ect low expectations regarding pay rates or to the extent that intent to leave refl ects job satisfaction, an understanding on the part of workers that wage rates are not entirely or at all in their employer's control. The results from Models 1 and 2 also indicate no job lock effect from employerprovided health insurance coverage. (Note: when the interaction term between full-time status and employer-provided coverage is included, the sign on the health coverage variable becomes positive, probably as a result of moderate multicollinearity: VIFs 1.97 -2.04.) The estimations produced by Models 1 and 2 also show that even after controlling for all other variables, concerns about the dead-end nature of the job and workload stress remain strongly associated with intent to leave. The job rewards related to feeling challenged and interested (challenged) and properly trained and confident (self-effi cacy) also maintain their signifi cance even after controlling for all other variables as do the short-notice fl exibility and decision autonomy subscales. The altruistic aspects of the job (helping others) and being recognized and valued (recognition) do not have separate effects on turnover intentions above and beyond the other variables.
The results from Model 3 (actual turnover, including quits into unemployment) show that compensation variables are better predictors of turnover than other job characteristics and personal factors. Wages and travel reimbursement remain statistically signifi cant and negatively correlated to turnover even after controlling for all other job, worker, and labor market factors. Health insurance coverage and hours are not signifi cantly correlated with actual turnover once all other variables are controlled for, although increased hours/week is marginally signifi cant and negatively associated with leaving. The hours/week variable may lose signifi cance because of interaction with other job variables, especially wages. Although holding a second job is not signifi cantly associated with intent to leave, it is signifi cantly and positively correlated with actual turnover. This is in contrast to fi ndings reported by Benjamin and colleagues (2008) who found that having a second job significantly increased the likelihood that the person stayed in her home care job. It could be that workers with second jobs are having a harder time balancing work and other responsibilities, or that those with second jobs have more direct links to their next job into which they transition. The fact that this variable is signifi cantly associated with quits as well as job-to-job quits (Models 4 -6) suggests that the latter explanation has more validity. Table 4 displays estimates of the relative size of the wage, hours, and health benefi t effects. Estimations of relative effect sizes provide more valid information, especially in the case of nonrandom samples.
The size of the negative wage effect on turnover is substantially larger than it is for quit/stay intentions. The estimated reduction in intent to leave and actual turnover of a 20% wage increase ($9.23 -$11.08) is 7% and 28%, respectively. Simulations estimate that ensuring workers full-time hours reduces intent to leave by 31% and actual turnover by 21%. The simulations also indicate that reimbursing workers for travel costs can have about the same size effect on turnover as a $3.95 an hour wage increase. The price of gasoline was especially high in Maine during the period of this study; these results may not be the same when gas prices are lower. Note that simulations (based on models that did not include the interaction term between full-time status and health insurance coverage) indicate that employer-provided health insurance coverage reduces intent to leave by 51% but actual leaving by only 21%. However, once interaction terms are included, health insurance coverage effects become positive, refl ecting multicollinearity between variables. Model 4 ( Table 3 ) examines job-to-job transitions and adds the wage rate, typical hours, and health benefi ts at Time 2 (2007). The results show that the wages and hours at Time 2 are signifi cant and positively associated with turnover, as might be expected: Workers are leaving for jobs that pay higher wages and offer more hours. The analysis fi nds no signifi cant effect between job change and employer-provided insurance coverage in 2007. However, if there is a waiting period for health insurance benefi ts and workers were not yet receiving health insurance benefi ts at the time of the second survey, the estimated pull effect of health benefi ts may be underestimated. Models 5 and 6 ( Table 3 ) examine job-to-job transitions and include variables that measure the change in wages, hours, and health insurance status between 2005 and 2007. Note that Model 5 also includes the interaction terms between full-time status and employer-provided health insurance coverage. Model 6 excludes interaction terms to gauge the impact of the multicollinearity between interaction and component variables. When change variables are added, the wage variable at Time 1 remains negatively associated with leaving but loses statistical signifi cance. This is consistent with other turnover studies ( Clark et al., 1998 ) . It may refl ect the fact that workers with more human capital are Notes : EPHI = employer-provided health insurance. a The magnitude of the " job lock " effect of EPHI coverage is estimated as a percent change in predicted turnover compared with workers who do not have this benefi t. The simulated impact of wage increases is measured as the percent change in predicted turnover compared with workers earning the average hourly wage rate of $9.23. The simulated impact of increasing hours to full time is measured as the percent change in predicted turnover compared with workers working 27 hr/week typically. The magnitude of the effect of providing travel assistance is estimated as the percent change in predicted turnover compared with workers whose employer does not provide this benefi t. All estimates are based on the parameters produced using Models 2 and 3 ( Table 3 ) , holding all other predictor variables at their means or modes. b The magnitude of the " pull " effect of EPHI is estimated as a percent change in predicted job-to-job turnover compared with workers who did not get this benefi t by 2007. The simulated impact of wage increases is measured as the percent change in predicted job-to-job transition rate compared with workers who experienced the average hourly wage increase between 2005 and 2007 ($1.14). The simulated impact of hour/week increases is measured as the percent change in predicted job-to-job transition rate compared with workers who experienced the average hours/week increase between 2005 and 2007 (3 hr/week). All estimates are based on the parameters produced using Model 6 (Table 3) , holding all other predictor variables at their means or modes.
paid higher wages at Time 1 and are also more likely to be attractive to other employers and, [ Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990 ] .) The VIFs are quite large (2.6 -7.1), and as stated previously, with logistic regression models, VIF values above 2.5 tend to present problems ( Allison, 1999 ) . With that caution in mind, on balance, the full analysis does suggest that health benefi ts do hold some attraction, especially for those without coverage at Job 1. Table 4 also shows estimates of the relative size of wage and health benefi t pull effects (using Model 6; Table 3 ).
These simulations suggest that to induce workers to leave, the wage paid to the new job has to be at least $1 greater than the wage rate at the original job. The simulations also indicate that health benefi ts are relatively more attractive than wage increases below $2.50/hr.
Discussion
Because of rising Medicaid, Medicare, and health care costs, increasing compensation is less feasible and efforts to improve direct care jobs have tended to focus instead on changing management and supervision practices to improve work and job conditions ( Stone & Dawson, 2008 ) . The fi ndings reported here indicate that although the non-pecuniary rewards of home-based direct care work matter to workers and that improved supervision, training, and schedule fl exibility can reduce plans to leave, higher wages, more hours, and better benefi ts account for more actual job turnover. These fi ndings raise the question of whether improvements to reduce job stress and enhance the nonmonetary rewards of home care work can compensate for low wages and a lack of benefi ts.
The results also suggest that home care workers may prefer more hours and higher wages to health benefi ts. As in other states, most home care workers in Maine come from low-income households. For these workers, the ability to earn more income may be more of an imperative than health insurance benefi ts, especially when workers have access to other sources of coverage. In this sample, most have health insurance coverage through some other source, including Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare (only 26% are without any health insurance coverage), and those who do not have health insurance coverage tend to be younger and poorer and thus perhaps less interested in insurance as a benefi t. The persistence and strength of the travel reimbursement benefi t effect to reduce leaving is also consistent with the needs of lowincome workers.
However, improving wages and benefi ts and increasing hours available to workers presents budgetary challenges to home care agency employers. The fee for service structure and low rates of reimbursement make it diffi cult for employers to offer competitive compensation and benefi ts. Inevitably, low-wage part-time workers are compelled to move out of home-based caregiving jobs to improve their basic economic security. Policy-level efforts to improve home care employers ' ability to pay higher wages and provide wage subsidies may be required to deal with the increasing demand presented by the aging " baby boom " generation.
Limitations
The analysis is limited by a lack of information regarding the quality and cost of the employerprovided health benefi ts. A more thorough investigation of the feasibility of health insurance benefi ts as a recruitment and retention tool for the direct care workforce should include an analysis of the relative effects of different health care plans. Information from employers indicates that most workers in our sample are required to pay between 26% and 75% of premium costs (with exceptions: one employer pays between 76% and 99%, four employers pay 100%, and one requires workers to pay the full cost). However, our survey did not collect information on the actual premiums paid by workers. The difference between the results reported here and those reported by Howes (2005) and Zawadski (2005) may refl ect differences in the affordability of the health benefi ts being offered. The health benefi ts analyzed in their studies were very inexpensive costing workers only a few dollars a month. Indeed, a subsequent study conducted by Howes (2008) indicates that higher quality benefi ts packages have a stronger retention effect. Furthermore, there are large interaction effects between increased hours and health benefi ts ( c 2 = 47.4, p < .001 at Time 2 and c 2 = 17.0, p < .001 at Time 1), which, together with the relatively small sample and low overall rate of employer-provided coverage, makes separating pull effects of health benefi ts from increased hours complicated. Further research with larger samples and more information about health benefi t plans is needed to disentangle these effects. Finally, as noted previously, if there is a waiting period for health insurance benefi ts and workers were not yet receiving health insurance benefi ts at the time of the second survey, the estimated pull effect of health benefi ts may be underestimated.
Similarly, the desirability of employer-provided health benefi ts and wages are likely related: Workers earning higher wages may fi nd health benefi ts more affordable and therefore more attractive. However, given the generally low wages paid to the home care workers in this sample, together with the fact that most of them come from lowincome households, the potentially biasing effect of this interaction may not be as strong. Among workers earning higher wages, health benefi ts are within the range of affordability and so interaction effects are likely to be more problematic. In other analysis not provided here, interactions between household income level and whether the employer offers health benefi ts were included in regression models to determine if workers from higher income households valued these benefi ts more than those from low-income households. The interaction effect was insignifi cant (probably refl ecting the limited variation in income among this low-income sample) and did not change the estimated effects of wages and benefi ts presented here.
Although all models include an extensive set of variables measuring worker-and job-level attributes, to the extent that there remains some correlation between unobserved characteristics of workers and their jobs in the disturbance terms, the estimates cannot be interpreted as pure effects of job characteristics. That said, because wages and benefi ts are generally offered at the agency level, not at the individual level, the endogeneity effects may not be large. Additional analyses conducted found no evidence that changes in wages, hours, and likelihood of having employer-provided health insurance coverage from Job 1 to Job 2 were merely the result of more attractive employees leaving and getting better jobs with improved compensation. In all cases, the dummy variable fl agging leavers was either the only signifi cant variable or had a much larger impact than other worker characteristics.
Another limitation of this study concerns the reliability and validity of some of the subjective job quality subscales. Although following the lead of Brannon and colleagues (2007) , who used previously validated measures of job problems and rewards, the Cronbach's alpha scores on 3 (challenged, helping others, hazardous) of the 11 job quality subscales were below the recommended level of .70. The subscales were developed and tested on facility-based health and direct care workers; these items may be perceived differently by home-based care workers. Also, the fl exibility subscales have not been previously tested. Nonetheless, all measures were found to be moderately to strongly associated with overall job satisfaction and signifi cantly predictive of intent to leave/stay.
Finally, although much effort was taken to ensure its representativeness, the sample used here was not a random sample. Readers should use some caution in interpreting the fi ndings reported here as respondents may not be representative of all home care workers in Maine let alone home care workers in general.
